We study all-pay contests with an exogenous minimal e¤ort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only if his e¤ort (output) is equal to or higher than the minimal e¤ort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a¤ects their cost of e¤ort. The designer decides about the size and the number of prizes. We analyze the optimal prize allocation for the contest designer who wishes to maximize either the total e¤ort or the highest e¤ort. It is shown that if the minimal e¤ort constraint is relatively high, the winner-take-all contest in which the contestant with the highest e¤ort wins the entire prize sum does not maximize the expected total e¤ort nor the expected highest e¤ort. In that case, the random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated to all the participants yields a higher expected total e¤ort as well as a higher expected highest e¤ort than the winner-take-all contest.
Introduction
In real-life contests, contestants often face participation constraints. For example, students who compete for grades in exams are required to achieve a minimal grade, or otherwise fail. Likewise, entry in professional sport competitions is often restricted, and only contestants who have achieved a certain prede…ned minimal requirement are allowed to compete. Researchers at universities too are required to achieve a minimal quality and quantity of output in order to be promoted. Indeed, initial research in contest design has found that limiting the number of contestants can be advantageous (see Baye et al., 1993 , Taylor, 1995 , and Fullerton & McAfee, 1999 . Therefore it is clear that a contest designer who wishes to maximize the contestants'total e¤ort should use endogenous participation constraints such as a reservation price or entry fees in order to exclude players with low valuations (abilities) from a contest. However, in many contests the participation constraints are exogenous (for example, the length (time) of R&D races or the minimum funds required for a candidate to participate in a political contest). In such contests, the contest designer will have limited control over the design since he cannot change the participation constraints.
In this paper, we assume all-pay contests with exogenous participation constraints and study the optimal allocation of prizes in these contests. 1 In an all-pay contest with a single prize the contestant with the highest e¤ort (output) wins the entire prize, but all the contestants bear the cost of their e¤ort. 2 It is well known that the all-pay contest under incomplete information with the optimal participation constraint is the optimal mechanism that maximizes the contestants'expected total e¤ort (see Myerson (1981) ). However, if the participation constraints are exogenous and are relatively high, neither is the e¢ ciency of the standard all-pay contest with a single prize nor the optimal allocation of prizes clear. In contests without participation constraints, the winner-take-all structure in which the contestant with the highest e¤ort (output) wins the 1 There might be other mechanisms which perform better than the all-pay contest in an environment with participation constraints, but we assume here that the general form of the contest is exogenous (all-pay) while the prize structure is endogenous. 2 A di¤erent model emphasizes the use of contests to extract e¤ort under "moral hazard" conditions (see Lazear and Rosen (1981) , Green and Stokey (1983) , Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) , and Rosen (1986) ). There output is a stochastic function of the unobservable e¤ort, and the identity of the most productive agent is determined by an external shock.
entire prize sum is usually the optimal architecture that maximizes the contestants' expected total e¤ort.
For example, Barut and Kovenock (1998) studied a multi-prize all-pay contest under complete information, and showed that the revenue maximizing prize structure allows any combination of k 1 prizes, where k is the number of contestants. In particular, they showed that allocating the entire prize sum to a unique …rst prize is optimal. Sela (2001, 2006 ) studied a one-stage all-pay contest and a two-stage all-pay contest with multiple prizes under incomplete information. In both cases, they showed that for a contest designer who maximizes the expected total e¤ort, if the cost functions are linear in e¤ort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single …rst prize. Schweinzer and Segev (2009) demonstrated that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize sum to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. Fu and Lu (2009) studied a multi-stage sequential elimination Tullock contest, and showed that the optimal contest eliminates one contestant at each stage until the …nal, and the winner of the …nal takes the entire prize sum.
In our model of the all-pay contest with a minimal e¤ort constraint, a contestant can participate only if his e¤ort is equal to or higher than the minimal e¤ort constraint. Contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a¤ects their cost of e¤ort. The designer decides about the size and number of prizes. He can allocate prizes such that the contestant with the highest e¤ort wins a prize which is higher or equal to the prize of the contestant with the second highest e¤ort, which is higher or equal to the prize of the contestant with the third highest e¤ort, and so on. The designer maximizes either the expected total e¤ort or the expected highest e¤ort. According to our analysis, in contests with a relatively high minimal e¤ort constraint, each contestant must have a chance to win the entire prize sum; otherwise the contestants will not participate in the contest. This result, however, eliminates the option of a contest with a …nite number of prizes in which the entire prize is distributed among several contestants according to their e¤orts, and leaves us without many alternatives to the winner-take-all contest. The alternative we consider in this paper is the random contest in which all the participants, namely, the contestants who exert e¤orts which are higher or equal to the minimal e¤ort constraint, have the same probability to win the entire prize sum.
In the random contest, since the prize is randomly allocated among all the participants, it is obvious that contestants do not have an incentive to exert e¤orts higher than the minimal e¤ort constraint. Thus, the participants'e¤ort in the winner-take-all contest is clearly higher than in the random contest. On the other hand, as we show, for any value of the minimal e¤ort constraint, the number of participants in the random contest is higher than in the winner-take-all contest. Consequently, it is not clear that the winner-take-all contest yields a higher expected total e¤ort than the random contest. Indeed, we demonstrate that if the minimal e¤ort constraint is relatively high, the winner-take-all contest, in which the contestant with the highest e¤ort wins the entire prize sum, does not maximize the expected total e¤ort nor the expected highest e¤ort. Furthermore, it is shown that, independent of the contestants'distribution of abilities, for high values of the minimum e¤ort constraint, the expected total e¤ort is higher when the entire prize is equally allocated to all the participants than when it is allocated to the contestant with the highest e¤ort only. 3 These results hold also in the case where the designer wishes to maximize the expected highest e¤ort. In other words, even if the designer maximizes the expected highest e¤ort, he will prefer equal allocation of the entire prize among all the participants in the contest over an allocation of the entire prize sum to the contestant with the highest e¤ort.
We also study the case where there are prize caps such that the value of a prize is smaller than the entire prize sum. Therefore, at least two contestants win prizes given that there are more than one participant.
It is shown that even with prize caps, independent of the contestants'distribution of abilities, the expected total e¤ort in the random contest is higher than in the winner-take-all contest for high levels of the minimal e¤ort constraint. Therefore in contests with prize caps and a minimal e¤ort constraint the random contest is still a legitimate contest form.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we analyze the symmetric equilibrium e¤ort functions and the expected total e¤ort in the winner-take-all contest in 3 Gavious, Moldovanu and Sela (2003) showed that in a framework identical to ours, if agents have convex cost functions, then e¤ectively capping the bids is pro…table for a designer facing a su¢ ciently large number of bidders. In this case, the prize is randomly allocated among all the contestants who exert an e¤ort equal to the bid cap. See also Che and Gale (1998) which the contestant with the highest e¤ort wins the entire prize. In Section 4 we analyze the expected total e¤ort in the random contest in which the entire prize sum is equally allocated among all the participants. In Section 5 we compare the total e¤ort in both forms of the contest, and in Section 6 we compare the expected highest e¤ort between these two contests. Section 7 analyzes the equilibrium and the total e¤ort in both contest forms when there are prize caps and Section 8 concludes.
The model
Consider an all-pay contest with n 2 contestants. Each contestant i makes an e¤ort x i : These e¤orts are submitted simultaneously. An e¤ort x i causes a cost according to a distribution function F which is common knowledge. We assume that F has a continuous density dF > 0: There also exists an exogenous minimal e¤ort 1 d 0 such that a contestant can participate in the contest only if his e¤ort is higher or equal to d:
The designer decides about the size and number of prizes for which he has a …xed total prize sum equal to 1. He can allocate prizes such that the contestant with the highest e¤ort wins a prize which is higher or equal to the prize of the contestant with the second highest e¤ort which is higher or equal to the prize of the contestant with the third highest e¤ort, and so on. We assume that the designer maximizes either the expected value of total e¤ort of the contestants or the expected value of their highest e¤ort. Each contestant i chooses his e¤ort in order to maximize his expected utility given the other competitors' actions and the values of the prizes.
The winner-take-all contest
Assume …rst a winner-take-all contest in which the designer allocates the entire prize sum to the contestant with the highest e¤ort given that his e¤ort is higher or equal to the minimal e¤ort constraint d: We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all participants use the same, strictly monotonic equilibrium e¤ort function b(c). Applying the revelation principle, player i with ability c chooses to behave as an agent with ability s to solve the following optimization problem:
In equilibrium, the above maximization problem must be solved by s = c: Then, the calculation of the equilibrium e¤ort yields
where k is a constant. Given that there is a minimal e¤ort constraint d; there exists a cuto¤ e c such that all the contestants with lower types (abilities) than e c decide to stay out of the contest and all the contestants with higher types than e c (participants) decide to participate in the contest. The e¤ort of the contestant with type e c (cuto¤) is equal to d and his expected payo¤ is equal to zero. Thus, we have e cF (e c) n 1
b(e c) = e cF (e c)
By (1) we obtain that k = R e c 0 F (y) n 1 dy, so the equilibrium e¤ort for every c e c is given by
Thus, the contestants'expected total e¤ort in the winner-take-all contest is given by
From equation (1) it can be veri…ed that e c d and e c = d only when both of these parameters are equal to Proposition 1 In the winner-take-all contest, the expected total e¤ ort increases in (su¢ ciently) small values of the minimal e¤ ort constraint, and decreases in (su¢ ciently) large values of the minimal e¤ ort constraint.
By Proposition 1 we can see that if the minimal e¤ort constraint d is relatively high, the contest designer does not have any incentive to manipulate the level of the participation constraint. The reason is that he cannot impose a minimal e¤ort constraint smaller than d, and if he imposes an endogenous minimal e¤ort constraint larger than d, the utility of the contest designer who maximizes the total e¤ort will be reduced.
Suppose now that the contest designer allocates the entire-prize sum to the two contestants with the highest e¤orts given that their e¤orts are higher or equal to d. In this case, the prize for the contestant with the highest e¤ort is a 0:5; and the prize for the contestant with the second highest e¤ort is 1 a:
Then, it can be veri…ed that the expected highest e¤ort is smaller or equal to a < 1. If the value of the minimal e¤ort is larger than the value of the …rst prize, d > a; the contest is not e¢ cient since no contestant will participate in it. Hence, if the minimal e¤ort constraint d is relatively high, an allocation of a …nite number of prizes is not a relevant option for a designer who wishes to maximize the total e¤ort. As such, we can conclude that in contests with a relatively high minimal e¤ort constraint, each contestant must have a chance to win the entire prize sum or else the contestants will not participate in the contest. Obviously this argument leaves us with few alternatives to the winner-take-all contest where the minimal e¤ort constraint has relatively high values. In the next section we discuss the alternative we …nd the most plausible.
The random contest
Consider the random contest in which the contest designer equally allocates the entire prize sum to all the contestants who exert e¤orts higher or equal to the minimal e¤ort constraint d; that is, all the participants in the contest have the same probability to win the entire prize sum. Denote by b c the cuto¤, such that all the contestants with lower types (abilities) than b c decide to stay out of the contest, and all the contestants with higher types than b c decide to participate in the contest. Since the allocation of the prize sum does not depend on the e¤ort level, given that it is higher or equal to the minimal e¤ort constraint d; the participants do not have any incentive to exert e¤orts higher than the minimal e¤ort constraint d. The probability of winning with an e¤ort of d is
Thus, the expected payo¤ of contestant i with ability of c that submits an e¤ort of d is
The expected total e¤ort is
where the cuto¤ b c satis…es Thus, by Proposition 2, like in the winner-take-all contest, the contest designer in the random contest does not have any incentive to manipulate the level of the minimal e¤ort constraint, given that it is relatively high.
Proposition 3 For any value of the minimal e¤ ort constraint, the number of participants in the random contest is equal to or larger than in the winner-take-all contest.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Proposition 3, the number of participants in the random contest is larger than in the winner-take-all contest. On the other hand, the participants' e¤orts in the winner-take-all contest are higher than in the random contest. In the next section we deal with the problem of which contest form, the random contest or the winner-take-all contest, yields the higher total e¤ort.
Total e¤ort
In this section we assume that the contest designer wishes to maximize the expected total e¤ort. Without a minimal e¤ort constraint (d = 0), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) have shown that the winner-take-all contest is the optimal design that maximizes the contestants'expected total e¤ort, given that their cost functions are linear. Below we show that Moldovanu-Sela's result does not necessarily hold in contests with minimal e¤ort constraints.
Denote by d R opt the optimal minimal e¤ort constraint that maximizes the contestants'expected total e¤ort in the random contest. The winner-take-all contest obviously yields a higher expected total e¤ort than the random contest for d = 0 and also for su¢ ciently small values of the minimal e¤ort constraint.
The following result gives the highest values of minimal e¤ort constraint, d = d R opt , for which the random contest most certainly will not be e¢ cient for a contest designer who maximizes the total e¤ort.
Proposition 4
For any value of the minimal e¤ ort constraint which is smaller than or equal to the optimal minimal e¤ ort constraint in the random contest, d d R opt , a mixed structure of the winner-take-all contest and the random contest yields a higher total e¤ ort than the random contest. Table below . 4 In a mixed structure of the winner-take-all contest and the random contest, the contest designer allocates the prize sum by having the contestant with the highest e¤ort win a prize equal to (1 a), while a prize equal to a is shared by all the contestants with e¤orts higher than or equal to the minimal e¤ort constraint d: We can see that for all 0:4 d < 1 the total e¤ort in the random contest is larger than the total e¤ort in the winner-take-all contest.
The following result generalizes the …ndings of Example 1.
Theorem 1 For every distribution of the contestants'abilities F; there exists a number 0 < d t (F ) < 1 such that for every minimal e¤ ort constraint d d t (F ); the expected total e¤ ort in the random contest is higher than in the winner-take-all.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the random contest is a legitimate option for a designer who maximizes the expected total e¤ort if the values of the minimal e¤ort constraint are relatively high.
Highest e¤ort
The contest designer's goal is not necessarily to maximize the contestants'expected total e¤ort. Rather he may wish to maximize the expected highest e¤ort. The expected highest e¤ort in the winner-take-all contest is
where b(c) is the equilibrium e¤ort function given by (2) and the cuto¤ e c is given by (1).
The expected highest e¤ort in the random contest is
where the cuto¤ b c is given by (5) .
Note that the highest e¤ort in the random contest is smaller or equal to d, while in the winner-take-all contest it is larger or equal to d. However, the probability that all the contestants will choose to stay out of the winner-take-all contest is higher than in the random contest. Thus, it is not clear that even the expected highest e¤ort in the winner-take-all is higher than in the random contest. Indeed, we have Theorem 2 For every distribution of the contestants' abilities F; there exists a number 0 < d h (F ) < 1, such that for every minimal e¤ ort constraint d d h (F ); the expected highest e¤ ort in the random contest is higher than in the winner-take-all.
Theorem 2 shows that even if the designer maximizes the expected highest e¤ort, he will prefer to equally allocate the entire prize among all the participants in the contest rather than to allocate the entire prize sum to the contestant with the highest e¤ort. The intuitive explanation to this result is that when the minimal e¤ort constraint d is very high, the expected number of participants is relatively low such that there is no meaningful di¤erence between the expected total e¤ort and the expected highest e¤ort. However, it could be easily veri…ed that in the case where a designer maximizes the expected highest e¤ort, the advantage of the random contest over the winner-take-all contest is valid for a smaller range of the minimal e¤ort constraint values than in the case where a designer maximizes the expected total e¤ort.
Prize caps
Suppose now that the designer has a …xed total prize sum equal to 2; and assume also that there exists a prize cap such that the maximal value of a single prize is 1: In such a case, it can be shown that for the designer who wishes to maximize the total e¤ort in the winner-take-all contest it is optimal to allocate two prizes, each equal to the prize cap 1, for the contestants with the two highest e¤orts given that their e¤orts are higher than or equal to the minimal e¤ort constraint d: In the random contest, if only one contestant decides to participate with an e¤ort equal to d, he wins a prize equal to 1; and in any other case with k 2 participants, each participant has the same probability to win a prize equal to 1.
In the winner-take-all contest with two identical prizes, each of them equal to 1, contestant i with ability c chooses to behave as an agent with ability s to solve the following optimization problem:
where (c) is the symmetric equilibrium e¤ort function given by
where the cuto¤ ! c is given by
The contestants'expected total e¤ort in the winner-take-all contest is given by
In the random contest, the probability of winning one of the two prizes with an e¤ort of d is
where the cuto¤ c satis…es
Theorem 3 For every distribution of the contestants'abilities F; there exists a number 0 < d c (F ) < 1 such that for every minimal e¤ ort constraint d d c (F ); the expected total e¤ ort in the random contest with a prize cap is higher than in the winner-take-all contest with a prize cap.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that if the levels of the prizes are limited, the random contest is still a legitimate option for a designer who maximizes the expected total e¤ort if the values of the minimal e¤ort constraint are relatively high.
We studied all-pay contests with a minimal e¤ort constraint and the following two forms of prize allocation:
1. A winner-take-all contest where the contestant with the highest e¤ort (output) wins the entire prize sum.
2.
A random contest where all the participants have the same probability to win the entire prize sum. We showed that independent of the distribution of the contestants'abilities, if the minimal e¤ort constraint is relatively high, the random contest yields a higher expected total e¤ort than the winner-take-all contest.
Our results were shown to hold for high values of the minimal e¤ort constraint, but we also demonstrated by an example that the results hold even for minimal e¤ort constraint values that are not relatively high.
The main implication of this paper is that the existence of participation constraints in contests is a possible explanation for why multiple-prize contests exist in the real world. Another implication of our results relates to the system of grading in many universities worldwide given that a designer (lecturer) has a constraint on the average of the students'grades in each class. In various universities, grades fall in the range of 0-100.
In Israel, for example, BA students whose grades are smaller than 56 and MA students whose grades are smaller than 65 fail. In that case, the minimal e¤ort constraints fall in the range in which the random contest might yield a higher expected total e¤ort as well as a higher expected highest e¤ort than the winner-take-all contest. Indeed, contests among students at universities are composed of a mixture of the random contest and the winner-take-all contest. However, according to our results, if the minimal output (grade) constraint is su¢ ciently high, the random contest is a better option than the winner-take-all contest and then binary grades of fail/pass should be applied.
Proof of Proposition 1
By (3) we have
By (1) and the implicit functions theorem we obtain
F (e c) n 1 + (n 1)e cF (e c) n 2 F 0 (e c)
Since the cuto¤ e c approaches zero when d approaches zero, and 1 F (e c) e cF 0 (e c) > 0 when e c approaches zero, we obtain that dT E W dd > 0 for su¢ ciently small values of d: Since the cuto¤ e c approaches 1 when d approaches 1, we have
Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 2
By (5) and the implicit functions theorem we have
By (14) and (4) we have
Since b c approaches zero when d approaches zero, we have
Since b c approaches 1 when d approaches 1, we have
Proof of Proposition 3
By (1) Indeed,
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that the contest designer allocates the prize sum by having the contestant with the highest e¤ort win a prize equal to (1 a), while a prize equal to a is shared by all the contestants with e¤orts which are higher or equal to the minimal e¤ort constraint d. The symmetric equilibrium in this case is given by
where c is the cuto¤ and s is a constant. Since the expected payo¤ of type c is zero and his e¤ort is equal to the minimal e¤ort level d; we obtain that s and c are given by
Then, we have
It can be shown that dc da 0; that is, the higher the prize shared by all the participants is, the higher is the number of participants in the contest. Note that in the random contest we have 
Hence, lim a!1 dT E da < 0, that is, decreasing the total prize allocated to all the participants or, alternatively, increasing the prize for the contestant with the highest e¤ort, necessarily increases the contestants'expected total e¤ort.
Proof of Theorem 1
By (3) and (4) we have
By (13) and (16) we obtain
9.6 Proof of Theorem 2
By (6) and (7) we have 
Proof of Theorem 3
Consider …rst the random contest. By (11) and the implicit functions theorem we have
where h( c ) = 2 n (1 + F ( c ) + ::: + F ( c ) n 1 ) + 2 c n (F 0 ( c ) + ::: + (n 1)F ( c ) n 2 F 0 ( c ))
By (10) and (18) 
Consider now the winner-take-all contest. By (9) we have
By (8) and the implicit functions theorem we obtain
Since the cuto¤ ! c approaches 1 when d approaches 1, we have 
